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SUMMARY OF PART ONE*
N PART ONE of this article, the author examined the provisions
of the Brussels Convention of 1926 for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law Relating to Mortgages and Liens. Although its pro-
visions are not in effect in either the United States or Great Britain,
the 1926 Convention has helped to reduce conflicts of law by speci-
fying what types of maritime claims give rise to liens or privileges
and by fixing the relative priority of these liens and of ship mort-
gages. It has also furthered the cause of recognition of ship mort-
gages on foreign flag vessels.
PART Two considers the 1952 Brussels Arrest Convention and
the relationship of the 1952 Convention to the 1926 Liens Conven-
tion. Maritime jurisdictional concepts in the civil law countries,
particularly France, are contrasted with the jurisdiction of Ameri-
can admiralty courts, and conflict of laws problems raised by the
two Brussels conventions are examined.
PART TWO
I
THE 1952 BRUSSELS CONVENTION ON THE ARREST
OF SEA-GOING VESSELS
The 1952 Brussels Arrest Convention' has complemented the
t A.B. 1958, Princeton University; LL.B. 1961, Harvard University. Member, New
York Bar; associated with Kramer, Marx, Greenlee & Backus, New York, New York.
* PART ONE of this article appeared in 1963 DuKE L.J. 671.
'International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships (Saisic Con-
servatoire des Navires de Met) [hereinafter cited as Arrest Cony.], Brussels, May 10,
1952, official texts in English and French. See 6 BENEDICT, AD MIRALTY 9 (7th ed. 1958)
[hereinafter cited as BENEDICT] (English text with notes on signatories); [1952] DROIT
MARITIME FRANOAIS 582 [hereinafter cited as D.M.F.] (French text); INTERNATIONAL MARI-
TIME CommTrrEE, MINUTES OF XXVTH CONFERENCE, ATHENS, 1962, at 118 [hereinafter
cited as XXVT CONFERENCE MINUTES] (French and English texts). For a general
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1926 Liens Convention2 which left open the crucial question of
enforcement of the substantive rights of lienors and mortgagees.
There was great diversity between the laws of the various nations
on the right of a creditor, particularly a foreign one, to seize or
arrest a vessel. In the United States, any claimant possessing a mari-
time lien was entitled to enforce that lien by arresting the vessel in a
libel in rem proceeding; in addition, American law recognized the
right to attach a vessel in a libel in personam action where the under-
lying claim was not a maritime lien and the respondent could not
be found within the district. In Great Britain, the right of arrest
was more limited than in the United States.4  On the continent
and in Latin America, where the theory of the in rem proceeding
was unknown, the law placed strict limitations upon the right to
seize a vessel prior to the adjudication of a claim. For example,
article 215 of the French Code of Commerce prohibited arrest of
vessels "ready to sail" or stopping at a port to load or unload
freight.5 Such rules were designed to protect the interests of cargo
discussion, see Ripert, Les Conventions de Bruxelles du 10 Mai 1952 sur l'Unification du
Droit Maritime, [1952] D.M.F. 343, 353-59.
For countries which have either ratified or adhered to the 1952 Arrest Convention,
see Kriz, Ship Mortgages, Maritime Liens, and Their Enforcement: The Brussels
Conventions of 1926 and 1952, 1963 DuE L.J. 671, 674-75.
2International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating
to Maritime Liens and Mortgages [hereinafter cited as Liens Conv.], Brussels, April
10, 1926, official text in French and in custody of Belgian government, published in
L.N.T.S. No. 2765 and 13 RxvuE DE DROrT MARITIME COMPARfi 535 (1926) [hereinafter
cited as REv. DoR] (edited by Leopold Dor). For English translations see 6 BENEDICT
382; PRICE, MARITIME LmNs 239 (1940) [hereinafter cited as PRICE]. A semi-official
English translation of the 1926 Convention is printed next to the official French
version in XXVTH CONFERENO MINUTES 78. This volume contains, inter alia, texts of
all Brussels conventions on maritime law, ratifications and accessions, and minutes
and resolutions of 1962 conference.
The English text used in the present article is the PacE translation as printed in
BENEDICT; the translation varies in certain respects from that of the International
Maritime Committee.
For background on international conferences and work of the Comit6 Maritime
International leading up to this convention, see PRICE 218-37; Diena, Principes du Droit
International Privd Maritime, 51 RECUEIL DES CouVs, ACADEMM DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 409, 438-40 (1935).
For a list of nations which have either ratified or adhered to the 1926 Liens
Convention, see Kriz, supra note 1, at 674-75.
0 GEN. ADM. R. 2, 5, 36; 2 BENEDICT 345-55 (6th ed. 1940). See also note 41 infra.
'The Administration of Justice Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46, which harmonized
English domestic law with the Arrest Cony., extended the jurisdiction of the admiralty
courts over foreign vessels and made it possible for the first time in England to
arrest either the vessel in respect to which the claim arose or any other ship in the
same ownership. See Hardy-Ivamy, Arrest of a Ship in an Action for Necessaries, 110
L.J. 134 (1960). For the text of this act, see 6 BENEDICT 14-33.
Art. 215, Code of Commerce, expressly prohibits arrest in order to obtain execu-
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owners and to promote freedom of navigation. Nevertheless, these
restrictions failed to give sufficient consideration to the claims of
mortgagees and other creditors. In 1949, at the instigation of the
American delegation, the Comit6 Maritime International considered
the question of drafting an arrest convention, a question which
had been discussed prior to World War 11.6 The convention
adopted in 1952 has strengthened the rights of maritime creditors
by making the provisional remedy of arrest more widely available.
The convention, in brief, permits certain types of maritime
claimants, 7 as defined in article 1 (1),8 to obtain arrest of a vessel in
order to enforce such claims. A claimant must present such a re-
quest to competent judicial authorities of a contracting state. 0 Op-
tion of a judgment when a vessel is "ready to sail," which means when the master
is possessed of his clearance papers. By judicial decision, article 215 applies to the
provisional remedy of arrest as well. See, e.g., St&. Marocaine de Participation
Industrielle v. Armement Daney, Cour d'Appel, Rennes, July 6, 1961, (1962] D.M.F.
467 (fishing vessel calling at port to unload cargo immune from arrest); Cie. des
Messageries Maritimes v. Administrations des Douanes et Regies d'Indochine, Saigon,
Indochina, Sept. 10, 1952, [1953] D.M.F. 580 (order of arrest obtained by customs
authorities was vacated); Vve. Lasry v. Cie. Bordelaise des Produits Chimiques, Cour
de Cassation (Ch. civ., sect. comm.), May 7, 1952, [1952] D.M.F. 465 (foreign vessels
as well as domestic are immune); Leblanc v. Hargreaves, Trib. Civ., Nice, June 24,
1883, [1884] JOURNAL Du DRozr INTERNATIONAL PRIVu 69 [hereinafter cited as CLUNET],
aff'd, Cour d'Appel, Aix, Nov. 28, 1883, [1884] CLUNET 297 (English yacht about to set
sail for Southampton was immune from attachment by Nice tradesman who had sold
goods to owner); Pmica 200; 1 RipERT, TRAIT DE DROIT MaR'TMz 765 (4th ed. 3 vols.
1950-1953) [hereinafter cited as RiPERT]. Similar restrictions are found in countries
where French Code of Commerce was influential, e.g., art. 870, Argentine Code of
Commerce. See The Aracaju, Fed. Ct. App., Bahia Blanca, Sept. 23, 1937, 38 REv. DoR
58 (1939).
c Note, Confdrence d'Amsterdam, Sept. 11-24, 1949, [1949] D.M.F. 452.
7"Claimant" under the Arrest Conv. is defined as a "person who alleges that a
maritime claim exists in his favor." Under American admiralty parlance, the "claimant"
is the shipowner who responds to the libel of his vessel, i.e., the defendant. GILMOREu
& BLACK, ADMIRALTY 33 (1957) [ hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLAcK]. In this article,
the word "claimant" is used in the sense in which it is defined in the convention.
sArrest Cony., art. 1(1), note 12 infra.
9 Id., art. 4.
"1Id., art. 5: "The Court or other appropriate judicial authority within whose
jurisdiction the ship has been arrested shall permit the release of the ship upon
sufficient bail or other security being furnished, save in cases in which a ship has
been arrested in respect of any of the maritime claims enumerated in article 1, (o)
and (p). In such cases the Court or other appropriate judicial authority may permit
the person in possession of the ship to continue trading the ship, upon such person
furnishing sufficient bail or other security, or may otherwise deal with the operation
of the ship during the period of the arrest.
"In default of agreement between the parties as to the sufficiency of the bail or
other security, the Court or other appropriate judicial authority shall determine the
nature and amount thereof.
"The request to release the ship against such security shall not be construed as
[Vol. 1964:70
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portunity is afforded to the owner of a vessel to obtain release of
the vessel by posting bond or other security.10 An important con-
sideration under the arrest convention is whether the court has
jurisdiction over the merits of the action or is competent merely
to order arrest of the vessel until bond or other security to obtain the
release of the vessel has been provided. This problem arises because
in certain countries, such as the United States, arrest of the vessel
may give the court jurisdiction to proceed on the merits without
obtaining jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whereas in
continental civil law countries, the mere arrest of a vessel does not
give the court such jurisdiction. These conflicting jurisdictional
theories were compromised under article 7 of the convention, which
provides that in certain cases a court must entertain jurisdiction over
the merits after the vessel has been arrested.1'
The following aspects of the convention will be examined: the
types of claims justifying arrest; vessels which may be arrested; the
procedure for obtaining arrest and the rights of the defendant; and
jurisdiction over the arrest as distinguished from jurisdiction over
the merits.
A. Types of Claims Justifying Arrest
Under article 2 of the 1952 Convention, it is provided that "a
ship flying the flag of one of the Contracting States may be arrested
in the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting States in respect of any
maritime claim, but in respect of no other claim ... ." (Italics added.)
Some seventeen types of "maritime claims" justifying arrest are
enumerated in article 1 (1), including claims for collision, personal
injury, salvage, cargo damage, general average, supply and repairs,
wages, mortgages, and claims relating to disputed ownership of a
vessel, charter parties, and carriage of goods.'2  The concept of
an acknowledgment of liability or as a waiver of the benefit of the legal limitations
of liability of the owner of the ship."
11 Id., art. 7, note 40 infra.
22Id., art. 1(l): "In this Convention the following words shall have the meanings
hereby assigned to them:
"(1) 'Maritime Claim' means a claim arising out of one or more of the following:
(a) damage caused by any ship either in collision or otherwise; (b) loss of life or
personal injury caused by any ship or occurring in connexion with the operation of
any ship; (c) salvage; (d) agreement relating to the use or hire of any ship whether
by charterparty or otherwise; (e) agreement relating to the carriage of goods in any
ship whether by charterparty or otherwise; (f) loss of or damage to goods including
baggage carried in any ship; (g) general average; (h) bottomry; (i) towage; (j) pilot-
age; (k) goods or materials wherever supplied to a ship for her operation or mainte-
nance; (1) construction, repair or equipment of any ship or dock charges and dues;
(m) wages of Masters, Officers, or crew; (n) Master's disbursements, including disburse-
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"maritime claim" for purposes of the arrest convention is extremely
broad and encompasses virtually all claims of a maritime nature,
whether or not they give rise to a maritime lien or privilege under
the 1926 Convention. It should be noted, in particular, that a
supply or other claimant whose privilege or lien under the 1926
Convention has been extinguished by reason of the period of limita-
tions is not prevented for that reason from obtaining arrest of the
vessel with respect to which the claim arose.' 3
B. Vessels Subject to Arrest
In determining whether a particular vessel which is lying in the
port of a contracting state (e.g., France) may be arrested, it is first
necessary to ascertain to what vessels the 1952 Convention is applica-
ble and to what persons its provisions are available. First of all, a
distinction is made between vessels of contracting states and those of
noncontracting states. The convention is applicable in any contract-
ing state to all vessels flying the flag of a contracting state.14 How-
ever, in a purely domestic situation with no international aspect,
such as the case of a French creditor seeking to arrest a French flag
vessel, the domestic law of the forum and not the convention is
applicable.'5 A vessel of a contracting state may be arrested only in
respect to one of the types of claims enumerated in article 1.10 If a
vessel flying the flag of a noncontracting state is involved, it may be
arrested either in support of one of the claims enumerated in article
1 (1) of the 1952 Convention or if the arrest would be permitted
under the domestic law of the forum.'7
The personal status of the claimant is also important. A foreign
claimant who is not a national of a contracting state may encounter
some difficulty in obtaining arrest of a vessel, unless arrest would
ments made by shippers, charterers or agents on behalf of a ship or her owner; (o)
disputes as to the title to or ownership of any ship; (p) disputes between co-owners
of any ship as to the ownership, possession, employment, or earnings of that ship;
(q) the mortgage or hypothecation of any ship."
"8 See Boyer v. St6. Entreprise Villani, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ., sect. comm.),
Feb. 19, 1958, [1958] D.M.F. 326; 1 RIPERT 797.
S14Arrest Conv., art. 8(1).
Irid., art. 8(4): "Nothing in this Convention shall modify or affect the rules of
law in force in the respective Contracting States relating to the arrest of any ship
within the jurisdiction of the State of her flag by a person who has his habitual
residence or principal place of business in that State."
'
6 ld., art. 8(1).
1 I7d., art. 8(2): "A ship flying the flag of a non-Contracting State may be arrested
in the jurisdiction of any Contracting State in respect of any of the maritime claims
enumerated in article 1 or of any other claim for which the law of the Contracting
State permits arrest."
[Vol. 1964: 70
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otherwise be available under the domestic law of the forum. This
is because a court may exclude a claimant from the benefits of this
convention if the claimant is not a resident or does not have its
permanent residential or business establishment in one of the con-
tracting states.' 8 Assignment of the claim to an organization having
its principal establishment in the country where it is desired to
arrest a vessel will not be recognized if its purpose is to thwart the
above provisions.'
Assuming that the convention is applicable (as, for example, in
the case of a French creditor seeking to arrest an Italian flag vessel),
the rights of the creditor are broader than they would otherwise be
in a purely domestic situation (as in the case of a French creditor
seeking to arrest a French vessel in France). Thus in the former case,
article 3 of the convention, 20 which provides that a vessel may be
arrested even though it be "ready to sail," would be applicable; this
provision would supersede article 215 of the French Code of Com-
merce, which prohibits arrest of a vessel "ready to sail."2 '
The right of arrest exists not only with respect to the vessel upon
which a lien exists or with respect to which the claim arose, but it
also extends in many cases to "any other ship which is owned by the
person who was, at the time when the maritime claim arose, the
owner of the particular ship .... "22 Under the broad definition of
181d., art. 8(3): "Nevertheless any Contracting State shall be entitled wholly or
partly to exclude from the benefits of this Convention any government of a non-
Contracting State or any person who has not, at the time of the arrest, his habitual
residence or principal place of business in one of the Contracting States."
1d., art. 8(5): "When a maritime claim is asserted by a third party other than
the original claimant, whether by subrogation, assignment or otherwise, such third
party shall, for the purpose of this Convention, be deemed to have the same habitual
residence or principal place of business as the original claimant."
20 Id., art. 3 (1), note 22 infra.
21 See note 5 supra. In the case of Vve. Lasry v. Cie. Bordelaise des Produits
Chimiques, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ., sect. comm.), May 7, 1952, [1952] D.M.F. 465,
the French Court of Cassation held that article 215 applies to protection of foreign
vessels from arrest as well as to French vessels. The claimant in that case, the owner
of the cargo, was held to be entitled to damages from a supply creditor who had
arrested the Italian vessel, about to set sail, whose captain had secured his clearance
papers. The creditor who had supplied the vessel on an earlier voyage had arrested
the vessel in Algiers where it stopped en route to Bordeaux. This rule will continue
to be applicable unless the creditor obtaining arrest is a national of a contracting state.
"2Arrest Cony., art. 3(1): "Subject to the provisions of para (4) of this article and
of article 10, a claimant may arrest either the particular ship in respect of which
the maritime claim arose, or any other ship which is owned by the person who was, at
the time when the maritime claim arose, the owner of the particular ship, even though
the ship arrested be ready to sail; but no ship, other than the particular ship in
respect of which the claim arose, may be arrested in respect of any of the maritime
claims enumerated in article 1, (o), (p) or (q)."
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ownership in article 3 (2), it would appear that a creditor having a
maritime claim against vessel X owned by corporation A would be
entitled to enforce his claim by arresting vessel Y owned by corpora-
tion B if the shares of A and B corporations were all owned by the
same individual or corporation.23 This rule under which a creditor
may compel the appearance of a shipowner by arresting any vessel of
his fleet, even if owned by another corporation, is subject to three
important qualifications. First, in the case of ship mortgages and
disputes as to ownership or between co-owners of a ship, only the par-
ticular vessel upon which the claim arose may be arrested.2' Sec-
ondly, if a vessel has been chartered under a demise or bareboat
charter, under which the control of the vessel is in the hands of the
charterer, a creditor of the charterer may still arrest such vessel or
other vessels of the charterer, but no other vessels of the same owner
may be arrested.25  Thirdly, if the claimant chooses to arrest some
vessel in the same ownership, he cannot seek to enforce his claim by
arresting the vessel with respect to which the claim originally arose
unless the first vessel arrested or the security posted for its release has
been discharged.26
C. Arrest Procedure and Rights of the Defendant
Except that it requires the arrest to be obtained under judicial
supervision,2 7 the convention does not purport to specify the proce-
2Id., art. 3(2): "Ships shall be deemed to be in the same ownership when all
the shares therein are owned by the same person or persons."
24 Id., art. 3(1), note 22 suPra.
2"Id., art. 3 (4): "Vhen in the case of a charter by demise of a ship the charterer
and not the registered owner is liable in respect of a maritime claim relating to that
ship, the claimant may arrest such ship or any other ship in the ownership of the
charterer by demise, subject to the provisions of this Convention, but no other ship
in the ownership of the registered owner shall be liable to arrest in respect of such
maritime claims. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply to any case in which
a person other than the registered owner of a ship is liable in respect of a maritime
claim relating to that ship."
2Id., art. 3(3): "A ship shall not be arrested, nor shall bail or other security be
given more than once in any one or more of the jurisdictions of any of the Contracting
States in respect of the same maritime claim by the same claimant: and, if a ship
has been arrested in any one of such jurisdictions, or bail or other security has been
given in such jurisdiction either to release the ship or to avoid a threatened arrest,
any subsequent arrest of the ship or of any ship in the same ownership by the same
claimant for the same maritime claim shall be set aside, and the ship released by
the Court or other appropriate judicial authority of that State, unless the claimant
can satisfy the Court or other appropriate judicial authority that the bail or other
security had been finally released before the subsequent arrest or that there is other
good cause for maintaining that arrest."
2T Id., art. 4.
[Vol. 1964:70
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dure to be followed; this is left to the law of the forum. 28  Thus,
for example, a creditor wishing to arrest a vessel lying in a French
port should turn to French domestic law to determine the applica-
ble procedure. Arrest of a vessel in France requires an order from
the president of the tribunal of commerce of the port where the
vessel is lying.29 Upon receipt of a petition for arrest, the president
will scrutinize the petition to ascertain that good faith grounds
exist for such action. The owner or his representative may of course
move to deny the arrest, if, for example, the claim is not one of those
specified in article 1 (1)30 or the plaintiff is not a national of a con-
tracting state.31 After the arrest has been granted, the defendant may
move to have the vessel released by posting sufficient bond or other
security from which a judgment could be satisfied.3 2
Except in cases involving the title or the right to possession of the
vessel, the court must grant such a release upon the provision of
bond, for it has no discretion in the matter.33 In the absence of an
agreement by the parties regarding the amount of bond, the amount
2 Ad., art. 6, para. 2
20 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the intricacies of the jurisdiction
and venue of French courts. However, as a general rule, maritime claims are enforced
in tribunals of commerce before lay judges. Special admiralty courts were abolished
in 1791, during the French Revolution, and their jurisdiction was transferred to the
commercial courts, provided that the claim involved a so-called "acte de commerce."
See art. 633, Code of Commerce; 1 RiPERT 780-91. The commercial courts' jurisdiction
over provisional arrest of vessels is based upon article 417 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The ordinary civil tribunals will have jurisdiction in cases between non-
merchants not involving a so-called "act of commerce," such as actions for personal
injuries brought by a passenger of a vessel. An action to foreclose a ship mortgage
will generally be brought in the civil tribunals. See CHAUVEAU, TRArrt DE DRorr
MARITIm 160 (1958) [hereinafter cited as CHAUVEAU]. However, in cases where the
mortgage secures the claim of a shipbuilder, the commercial tribunals have occasion-
ally been held to be competent because construction of a vessel is deemed to be an
"act of commerce" and the mortgage is "an accessory" thereof. CHAUVEAU 160. Actions
for collision generally are brought in the civil tribunals. CHmuvEAu 401.
For a comparative analysis of the maritime jurisdiction of the French, American,
and English courts, see Stinson, Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction of the Courts of
Great Britain, France and the United States, 16 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1921).
10 See note 12 supra.
31 See note 18 supra.
32 Arrest Cony., art. 5, note 10 supra. See, e.g., Gerardi v. Societ6 les Marocains,
Cour d'Appel, Rabat, Morocco, March 6, 1957, [1959] D.M.F. 57; St. Franco-Tunisienne
d'Armement v. St. J. A. Goldschmidt et Cie., Trib. Comm., Cherbourg, March 13,
1958, [1958] D.M.F. 541; The Commodore Grant: (North Eastern Freighters, Ltd. v.
Cia. Espafiola de Petroleos, S.A.), Trib. Comm., Aix en Provence, Jan. 13, 1954, [1955]
D.M.F. 375, afJ'd, Cour d'Appel, Aix, May 11, 1954, [1955] D.M.F. 157, on appeal,
Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ., sect. comm.), July 17, 1957, [1958] D.M.F. 54, on remand,
Cour d'Appel, Nimes, July 2, 1958, [1959] D.M.F. 593.
" Arrest Conv., art. 5, note 10 supra; id., art. 1(1) (o) & (p), note 12 supra.
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will be set by the court according to the rules of the forum.34 In
cases where the court is not competent to adjudicate the merits of
the case, the bond will be designated as security for a judgment
rendered by any court which may have jurisdiction.8
In order to avoid abuse of the remedy of arrest, some countries
require the plaintiff to post a bond to indemnify the shipowner or
other defendant if the arrest is unjustified.86 Under the 1952 Con-
vention, the question of whether or not a bond must be posted by
the plaintiff in order to obtain an order of arrest is determined by
the law of the forum.3 7 In France, the party seeking arrest generally
has no such obligation, although the court may in its discretion re-
quire security from the plaintiff.38 If the arrest was not justified,
however, the defendant has a cause of action against the plaintiff for
damages caused by the wrongful arrest.3 9
D. Jurisdiction Over Arrest Distinguished From
Jurisdiction Over the Merits
Article 7 of the convention,40 under which the courts of a country
4id, art. 5, note 10 supra. The amount of the bail in France cannot exceed the
value of the vessel, even though the claim is for a greater amount. 1 RiPERT 808;
Marais, De la saisie conservatoire des navires en France, 6 Rav. DoR 22, 30 (1924). In
Belgium, courts may set bail equal to the amount of the claim, even if it exceeds
the value of the vessel. Smeetsters, De la saisie conservatoire des navires en Belgique,
7 Rsv. DOR 54, 59 (1924).
Ould., art. 7(2), note 40 infra.
ss E.g., Belgium. Smeetsters, supra note 84, at 57. For the United States practice,
see GEN. Anas. R. 24; 2 BENEDICT 568-77 (6th ed. 1940).
11 Arrest Conv., art. 6, para. 1.
CssAuvAu 168; Legendre, La Confdrence de Naples du Comitd Maritime Inter.
national, [1951] D.M.F. 575, 578.
"See, e.g., Petit Fr~re et Gabrielle v. Tercy, Trib. Comm., Seine, May 16, 1955,
[1956] D.M.F. 496; Bittar Fr&es v. Aminthe, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ., sect. comm.),
Nov. 28, 1951, [1952] D.M.F. 139; 1 LIPERT 804-05. In the United States, a party is
not generally entitled to recover damages resulting from the seizure of his vessel under
lawful process issued out of an admiralty court, even though the suit was dismissed.
2 BENEDICT 393-94 (6th ed. 1940).
"Arrest Cony., art. 7: "(1) The Courts of the country in which the arrest was
made shall have jurisdiction to determine the case upon its merits if the domestic law
of the country in which the arrest is made gives jurisdiction to such Courts, or in
any of the following cases namely: (a) if the claimant has his habitual residence or
principal place of business in the country in which the arrest was made; (b) if the
claim arose in the country in which the arrest was made; (c) if the claim concerns
the voyage of the ship during which the arrest was made; (d) if the claim arose out
of a collision or in circumstances covered by Article 13 of the International Convention
for the unification of certain rules of law with respect to collisions between vessels,
signed at Brussels on 23rd September 1910; (e) if the claim is for salvage; (f) if the
claim is upon a mortgage or hypothecation of the ship arrested.
(2) If the Court within whose jurisdiction the ship was arrested has not jurisdiction
to decide upon the merits, the bail or other security given in accordance with Article
[Vol. 1964:70
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in which a vessel has been arrested may decline jurisdiction over
the merits of the action, can best be understood by contrasting the
different concepts of jurisdiction prevailing in the United States
with those in the continental civil law countries.
In the United States, a maritime lien is enforced by libeling a
vessel in an in rem proceeding, which involves obtaining a warrant
ordering a federal marshal to arrest the vessel upon which the lien
exists.41 The maritime lien, an important substantive right, is tied
so closely to the in rem proceeding, the procedure for its enforce-
ment, that it can truly be said that the two are one. Substance can-
not be separated from procedure.42
Under the United States theory of jurisdiction in rem, the ship is
considered a separate personality and is liable as such. In the civil
law countries, such as France, a maritime claim giving rise to a
maritime privilege is recognized as having the nature of a "right in
the property" (droit rdel).43 However, this characterization of a
maritime privilege has not been translated into a procedure for suing
the ship as distinguished from suing the underlying debtor. In
France and other civil law countries, all actions are in personam.44
5 to procure the release of the ship shall specifically provide that it is given as
security for the satisfaction of any judgment which may eventually be pronounced
by a Court having jurisdiction so to decide; and the Court or other appropriate
judicial authority of the country in which the arrest is made shall fix the time within
which the claimant shall bring an action before a Court having such jurisdiction.
(3) If the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of a
particular Court other than that within whose jurisdiction the arrest was made or
to arbitration, the Court or other appropriate judicial authority within whose juris-
diction the arrest was made may fix the time within which the claimant shall bring
proceedings.
(4) If, in any of the cases mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, the action
or proceedings are not brought within the time so fixed, the defendant may apply
for the release of the ship or of the bail or other security."
,1 See GEN. Awir. . 9-12, 37; 2 BENEDICT 366-93 (6th ed. 1940). The libel in rem
is the right to proceed against the vessel itself. The maritime lienor, in addition,
possesses the right to bring a libel in personam against the person liable on the
claim. In order to recover a personal judgment in excess of the value of the property,
a libel in rem and libel in personam may be joined. See GEN. ADMi. R. 13 (remedies
for seamen wages, materialmen); GEN. ADm. R. 16 (remedies for ship mortgages);
GILMORn & BLACK 31. A libel in personam may also be commenced by attachment of
property, including any vessels of the person liable, where the defendant cannot be
found or does not do business within the jurisdiction. This is known as "libel in
personam with clause of foreign attachment." See, e.g., McGahern v. Koppers Coal
Co., 108 F.2d 652 (3d Cir. 1940); GEN. ADna. R. 5, 36; 2 BENEDICT 345-64 (6th ed. 1940).
42 "In American jurisprudence the existence of a maritime lien is synonymous with
the availability of a libel in rem." GiLMoRx & BLACK 510; PRICE 12.
'a CHAUVEAU 126-27.
"See Weser, Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, 10
AM. J. Cozip. L. 323 (1961).
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If it is desired to enforce a maritime privilege, it is possible to arrest
a vessel pursuant to the 1952 Brussels Convention. However, the
word "arrest" in this convention is used in the American sense of
"attachment." Its purpose is to compel the appearance of the owner
in an action in personam and to cause him to furnish security as a
condition for release of the vessel, pending determination of the
merits of the controversy. Hence, arrest under the 1952 Convention
is not synonymous, as in the admiralty parlance of the United States,
with commencement of an in rem proceeding. Rather, arrest under
the convention is analogous to the provisional remedy of attachment,
which is available in American courts in libels in personam.
Under American admiralty law, which recognizes jurisdiction
in rem and quasi in rem, it is taken for granted that a court ordering
arrest of a vessel thereby obtains jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits
of the claims against the owner, at least up to the value of the vessel
or other property seized, even if the debtor is not within the terri.
torial jurisdiction of the court.45  The same American admiralty
court has the power, if necessary, to order the sale of a vessel to
satisfy the liens against it.
Under the law of France and certain other civil law countries,
the questions of jurisdiction to arrest a vessel and of jurisdiction to
adjudicate the merits of the action and order sale of the vessel are
two separate matters.46 This is because there is no action analagous
to the American action in rem. 47 Arrest of the vessel itself does not
give the court jurisdiction or competence, to use civil law terminol-
ogy. The competence of a court to adjudicate a claim depends upon
(1) the nature of the claim and (2) personal status, i.e., the national-
ity or residence of the parties.48 Thus a lien holder wishing to
45 The traditional American" rule is that judgment in an action in rem cannot be
for more than the value of the 'ship and freight. The owner must be joined in an
action in persoriam before there can be a judgment for a greater amount. GiLhMOn &
BLACK 511, 652-54. But see The Fairisle, 76 F. Supp. 27 (D. Md. 1947), af'd sub nor.
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dean, 171 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1948), where the libel was in
rem but judgment was entered for $45,100, although the vessel was released on stipula.
tion for $25,000.
4CfnluvEAu 166; 1 RIPERT 791, 797, 800, 806-08; Ripert, supra note 1, at 358.
'7 However, in the following civil law countries courts do recognize jurisdiction
forum drresti in certain maritime cases, even though it is not strictly analogous to the
American in rem proceeding: Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium. See
1 RiPERT 791.
48 As a general rule in civil law countries, actions involving persons and movables
must be brought in the courts of defendant's domicile. See Weser, supra note 44, at
328. If defendant is a foreigner, however, certain extraordinary rules of jurisdiction
may apply pursuant to which the nationality of the plaintiff will determine the forum.
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execute a maritime lien must bring an action in personam against
the debtor in a competent court. If the defendant is a nonresident
shipowner and the plaintiff is a foreign creditor, there may not be
any competent court within the territorial limits of the country in
which it is desired to arrest the vessel.49
Suppose, for example, that a United States supplyman having a
lien on a Panamanian vessel lying in a French port wished to fore-
close that lien in France, and no French parties were involved in
the controversy. The court would not be competent to decide the
merits. However, the tribunal of commerce in the French port
would be competent to order provisional arrest of the vessel and to
take other types of protective measures.50 Under the terms of the
1952 Arrest Convention, the tribunal of commerce which had
ordered the arrest of the vessel would be competent to consider
objections of the shipowner to the arrest 1 and to entertain requests
that the vessel be released upon bond. However, the tribunal of
commerce would then be obliged to transfer the action to a court
competent to adjudicate the merits, which might be a court in
France, a court in a foreign country, or an arbitration panel.52 If
proceedings were not commenced within a time set therefor, the
tribunal of commerce would be competent to consider a request
For example, under arts. 14-15, Civil Code, a French national may sue a foreigner
or be sued in a French court even upon obligations contracted outside of France.
Weser, supra at 324-27.
"°While French courts are competent to entertain actions between foreigners,
there must be some connection between the parties and the forum, for instance, a
contract made there. See BATiFFOL, TR.Aun IrMMENTAME DE DROIT INTERNATONAL PYaV
774-79 (3d ed. 1959). Thus, in the case of a collision on the high seas between two
foreign vessels in which no French interests are involved, French courts are in-
competent over the merits, although they may be competent to order arrest. See note
50 infra. See also Stinson, supra note 29, at 14-15.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the retention of jurisdiction of
a suit between two foreigners is within the discretion of a district court and that
the exercise of this discretion may not be disturbed. Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring,
Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U.S. 515 (1930). In that case jurisdiction was refused by the
district court "under all the circumstances," and it was held error for the Second
Circuit to overrule that exercise of discretion. See also The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355,
358 (1885); The Maggie Hammond, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 435, 457 (1870).
"The French cases hold that a foreigner may obtain arrest of a foreign vessel
in France, even though no French court would be competent to adjudicate the merits.
E.g., Petrico v. Rogenaes, Cour d'Appel, Alger, Feb. 13, 1923, 2 REv. DOR 518 (1923)
(following a collision on the Danube between a Norwegian vessel and the Muntenia,
another foreign flag vessel, the Norwegian owner obtained an order of arrest of the
Muntenia from the commercial court in Bougie, Algeria); 1 RIPERT 797.
"I See Arrest Cony., art. 7(2), note 40 supra.
' d., art. 7(3), note 40 supra.
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that the arrest be vacated and the security posted by defendant be
released.53
In countries which have subscribed to the 1952 Convention but
which do not recognize jurisdiction based on arrest of a vessel, there
is one possible exception to the rule that a court ordering arrest will
not be competent to consider also the merits of the action. That
exception is article 7 (1) of the convention,54 which provides that in
certain enumerated types of claims, including mortgage claims, the
courts of the country in which the arrest was made shall have juris-
diction over the merits. However, this article, being a benefit of
the convention,n; will apply only if both plaintiff and defendant are
from contracting states. No cases have been found where a claimant
of a contracting state has invoked this article in a French court and
urged that the court was required to assume jurisdiction over the
merits. Presumably, however, if a mortgagee of a contracting state
(e.g., Belgium) arrested a vessel in France, another contracting state,
the mortgagee would be entitled by virtue of the conventions to re-
quire the French courts to entertain the merits of the action.
II
TiH BRUSSELS CONVENTIONS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
The subject matter of the 1926 Liens Conventions and the 1952
Arrest Convention may best be correlated by applying the provisions
of these two conventions to the resolution of hypothetical cases. In
the first four illustrations which follow, it is assumed that a vessel
has been arrested in the port of a state which has adopted both con-
ventions, and in view of the earlier discussion, let us assume that this
country is France. In the fifth illustration, it is assumed that a for-
eign flag vessel has been libeled in a United States port, that credi-
tors from states contracting to the 1926 Convention have intervened
in the proceeding, and that a United States court applying modern
choice of law rules would apply the provisions of the 1926 Brussels
Convention.
8Id., art. 7(4), note 40 supra.
14 1d., art. 7, note 40 supra. It should be noted that the Arrest Cony. was adopted
by Costa Rica subject to reservation that it "does not recognize the obligations of
subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of paragraph Ist of Article 7, as according
to the laws of the Republic the only courts competent to hear actions relating to
maritime liens are those of the domicile of the plaintiff, unless the case concerns the
cases contemplated by letters (o), (p) and (q) of subsection (1) of Article 1st .. " 6
BENEDICt 14.
65Id., art. 8(3), note 18 supra.
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A. First Illustration
Let us suppose that a vessel flying the flag of a signatory to the
1926 Convention (e.g., Norway) is furnished with supplies in the
port of another contracting state (e.g., France) and that this vessel
is subject to a ship mortgage duly executed under the law of Norway.
First of all, can the French supplyman arrest the vessel? Yes,
for under the 1952 Arrest Convention (to which France but not
Norway is a party), a creditor may arrest a vessel for any one of the
seventeen types of claims enumerated in article 1, regardless of
whether such claim is privileged, or for any other claim permitted
by the domestic law of the forum.5 6
On these facts, a French court would have jurisdiction both to
order arrest and to consider the merits of the case.57 The question
of whether the supply claim was entitled to the status of a lien or
privilege would be tested under the 1926 Convention, since both the
claimant and shipowner are nationals of contracting states.58  A
valid supply privilege would exist if the supplies were delivered
away from the home port and were "necessary for the preservation
of the vessel" or "continuation of the voyage" and if the claim were
exercised within the proper limitation period of six months.59 If
the time period had run, the owner would continue to be responsi-
ble on the underlying debt, but the plaintiff would rank only as an
unsecured creditor.
If the shipowner were not financially able to pay the supply lien
in order to obtain release of the vessel, the mortgagee would un-
doubtedly wish to intervene in this proceeding. Members of the
crew would file wage claims. Under article 1 of the 1926 Conven-
tion,6 0 the French court would be compelled to recognize the valid-
ity of the mortgage if it were properly executed according to the law
6 Id., art. 8(2), note 17 supra.
5 Id., art. 7(l)(a), note 40 supra.
" Liens Cony., art. 14: "The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in
each Contracting State in cases in which the vessel to which the claim relates belongs
to a Contracting State, as well as in any other cases provided for by the national laws."
" id., art. 9(1): "Maritime liens shall cease to exist, apart from any provision of
national laws for their extinction upon other grounds, at the expiration of one year:
provided that the lien referred to in Article 2(5) for necessaries supplied to the vessel
shall cease at the expiration of six months."
0 Article 1 provides: "Mortgages, hypothecations and other similar charges upon
vessels, duly effected in accordance with the law of the Contracting State to which
the vessel belongs, and registered in a public register either at the port of the
vessel's registry or at a central office, shall be recognised and treated as valid in all
the other Contracting States."
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of Norway. If, as is usually the case in ship foreclosures, the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the vessel were insufficient to satisfy all
creditors, there should in theory be no conflict between the order of
priority of the liens and the mortgage in France and in Norway,
since priority is settled under the convention. 61 This is a more
satisfactory solution to the priority problem than the traditional
conflicts rule that the order of priority is governed by the law of the
forum because it is procedural rather than substantive 2 or because
it is a matter of local public order. 3
B. Second Illustration
If, in the first illustration, a vessel of the United States, which is
not a party to either the 1926 or 1952 conventions, were supplied
in France, it could likewise be arrested by a French supplyman in
France or in a port of some other state adhering to the 1952 Arrest
Convention. 4
Although the right of a French supplyman to a privilege under
these facts would not be governed by the 1926 Convention, since
the United States is not a party, this would not make a substantial
difference; the French municipal law, the Law of February 19,
1949, 5 was modeled upon the 1926 Liens Convention and is similar
to it in most respects. If the vessel were subject to a preferred ship
mortgage created under United States law, the mortgage would be
enforceable in France, provided that the mortgagee could prove that
it was validly created under United States law.60 A supplyman's
61At least there would be no major conflicts. There continue to be minor differ-
ences between the convention and the various domestic laws of the signatories.
2 See note 85 infra.
08 See 2 RiPERT 110-11; note 84 infra.
61Arrest Cony., art. 8(2), note 17 supra. Even a creditor from a noncontracting
state may arrest a foreign vessel in France on a cause of action arising elsewhere. See
also 1 RPrET~ 797; note 50 supra.
" Law No. 49-226 of Feb. 19, 1949, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Franaise,
1890 [hereinafter cited as J.O.] Feb. 19, 1949, [1949] D.M.F. 345. This law repealed old
arts. 190-96 of the Code of Commerce and substituted therefor new arts. 190-96; it
also modified art. 214 of the Code of Commerce (relating to priorities between
creditors) and arts. 820 and 331 of the Code of Commerce. Inconsistent provisions of
the Law of July 10, 1885, the basic French statute relating to ship hypothecations,
were abrogated. For legislative history of the Law of 1949, see Ripert, La rdforme des
privilages maritimes par la loi du 19 fevrier 1949, [1949] D.M.F. 223, 226. This law
was made applicable to French overseas territories and to the then trusteeship terri-
tories of Togo and Cameroons by Decree No. 50-1047, Aug. 19, 1950, J.O. 9199, Aug.
27, 1950.
66 Although Liens Cony., art. 1, note 60 supra, would not be applicable, since the
U. S. is not a party to the convention, a mortgage validly executed under United
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claim would prevail over the mortgage if the goods furnished were
"necessary for the preservation of the vessel or continuation of the
voyage"6' 7 and the claim were less than six months old,6 even though
the opposite order of ranking lien and mortgage would have pre-
vailed if the vessel had been libeled in the United States.
C. Third Illustration
Assume that the Norwegian vessel in the first illustration had
received emergency repairs in an American shipyard and that the
American creditor wished to arrest the vessel in a French port. This
illustration differs from the first in that it involves nationals of
different countries in litigation in the court of a third country which
has little or no connection with the underlying transaction.
First of all, could the United States repairman arrest a Nor-
wegian vessel in a French port? Neither Norway nor the United
States is a party to the 1952 Arrest Convention which renders in-
applicable article 215 of the French Code of Commerce, the pro-
vision prohibiting arrest of vessels "ready to sail" or in the course
of a "voyage."' 9 Although no recent French cases have been found
where a foreign creditor's request for arrest of a foreign vessel was
denied on the ground that article 215 would be violated, this re-
mains a basis for denying the petition for arrest of a lienor from a
state not a party to the 1952 Convention.
Assuming that an order of arrest were obtained on these facts,
the French court would probably not assume jurisdiction over the
States law would be recognized under general choice of law principles. See, e.g., The
Wang Importer: (St6. Algdrienne des Ptroles Mory, Rdpublique Federale des 2tats
Unis v. St. Emerson S.S. Corp., itat Franqais), Cour d'Appel, Rennes, Feb. 6, 1962,
[1962] D.M.F. 475, where the Cour d'Appel of Rennes appointed three American
lawyers as experts to determine whether a preferred ship mortgage executed in New
York on an American flag vessel was valid under American law.
67 Code of Commerce, art. 191(6), as amended by Law of Feb. 19, 1949, the equiva-
lent of Liens Cony., art. 2(5).
08 Code of Commerce, art. 194, the equivalent of Liens Cony., art. 9 (1), note 59
supra. Under these provisions it would make no difference if the supply were made
prior or subsequent to the date of execution of the mortgage or of its endorsement
upon the vessel's document. Cf. Preferred Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, § 30(M), 41
Stat. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953 (1958).
"r For material on art. 215, French Code ef Commerce, see notes 5, 21 supra. If
a vessel is not "ready to sail," a foreign creditor may obtain arrest, even if the
vessel is foreign and the cause of action has no relationship with France. See note
50 supra.
The right to arrest a foreign vessel even though it is "ready to sail" could be
considered a benefit of the arrest convention. Article 8 (3) of the convention, note
18 supra, permits denial of so-called benefits of the convention to claimants of a
noncontracting state.
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merits in this type of case.70 Rather, under article 7 of the Arrest
Convention,7 1 jurisdiction would probably be remitted to a forum
more closely connected with the litigation, after bail had been set
and the vessel released.
D. Fourth Illustration
Assume that an Italian vessel hypothecated to an Italian bank
has been arrested in France by a French shipyard which has made
necessary repairs to the vessel. The owners being insolvent, other
creditors intervene, including supplymen from Great Britain, the
United States, Italy, and Spain. Crew members and officers file
claims for wages. The Italian mortgagee also intervenes. Since a
French claimant is involved, the French courts would be competent
both to order arrest of the vessel under the 1952 Arrest Convention
and to assume jurisdiction over the merits.7 2 If the vessel were sold,
the court would then consider, under the liens convention, whether
certain of the claims were privileged, and then, as between the
privileged claims, the order of their relative priority.
The validity of the mortgage or hypoth~que would be deter-
mined by Italian law, the law of the flag.73 The repair and supply
claims of Italian, French, and Spanish creditors, as well as the wage
claims of Italian crew and officers, would be governed by the uni-
form provisions of the liens convention applicable in France, Italy,
and Spain. What law, however, would govern the validity and rela-
tive rank of the purported liens of supply creditors from nonsigna-
tory states such as Great Britain and the United States? The 1926
Convention provides no guidance for the resolution of conflicts
between its uniform provisions and the laws of nonsignatory states;
the court would therefore have to apply its own rules of conflict of
laws.
While it is generally accepted conflict of laws doctrine that the
lien status of seamen's and officers' wage claims is determined by the
law of the flag74 and that the lien status of tort claims (e.g., personal
70 See notes 49, 50 supra.
71 See note 40 supra.
72 Arrest Cony., art. 7(l), note 40 supra; Weser, supra note 44, at 324-27; note 48
supra.
73 Liens Conv., art. 1, note 60 supra.
7' 4 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 117 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as RADEL]. Cf. The Graf Kot Trautvetter, 8 Fed. 833 (D.S.C. 1881) (master of
German vessel libeled in United States had no lien for wages, even though lien would
have existed under German law); The Tagus, [1903] P. 44 (C.A.) (Argentine law of flag
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injury, collision, etc.) is governed by the law of the territorial waters
in which the wrong was committed (the lex loci delicti),75 there
are at least three different conflict of laws rules which may be ap-
plied to supply and repair claims. The lien status of a person fur-
nishing supplies or repairs may be governed by (1) the law of the
place where the supplies or repairs were furnished, the lex loci
contractus;76 (2) the law of the forum, the lex fori;77 or (3) the law
of the flag.78
applied, but privilege of master extended by English law of forum from wages of last
voyage to all back wages).
7 4 RABEL, 118.
70 The lex loci contractus is most often followed by courts in the United States.
See, e.g., The City of Atlanta, 17 F.2d 311 (S.D. Ga. 1927) (U.S. vessel supplied in
Cuba; libel dismissed for failure to plead or prove law of Cuba); The Northern Star,
1925 Am. Mar. Cas. 1135 (E.D.N.Y. 1925) (U.S. vessel subject to preferred ship mort-
gage; failure of Brazilian supplier to prove lien under Brazilian law); The Woud-
richem, 278 Fed. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1921) (claim of Dutch supplyman dismissed for
failure to prove Dutch law); The Kaiser Wilhelm II, 230 Fed. 717 (D.N.J. 1916)
(German vessel supplied in England; libel dismissed because subjects of two belligerent
nations involved, with dictum that law of England, place of supply, would govern);
The Scotia, 35 Fed. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1888) (where British vessel supplied in U.S. and
Haiti, lien status determined under U.S. and Haitian law).
Apparently, the lex loci contractus is also applied in Canada and Germany. See
decisions cited in 4 RABEL 115-16.
7 The lex fori is applied because of the difficulties inherent in ascertaining the
domestic lien law of the loci contractus or by virtue of public policy considerations
in assuring equality between creditors in insolvency situations. See notes 82, 83 infra.
71 Eminent writers have advocated the law of the flag as a means of assuring uni-
form treatment of in rem claims against a particular vessel, including mortgages and
liens arising by operation of law. BATIFFOL, op. cit. supra note 49, at 548, 564; 2
RiPEaT 111-12,
In Italy the courts have with some consistency applied the law of the flag to
determine whether a lien exists upon a foreign vessel, even to the detriment of local
creditors who would have enjoyed a lien under Italian municipal law. See PRIca 216-17.
They have also applied the law of the flag to determine the order of priority of
claims against proceed! from the sale of a foreign vessel. 4 RABEL 116. See The
Mediterranean Star: (Barclay Banck [sic] v. Barabino), Genoa, Aug. 9, 1923, 25 IL
Dnus-ro MAmurifo 466 (1923), 7 REv. DOR 404 (1924) (French translation and excel-
lent note).
American courts, in considering whether the delivery of supplies in Italy gave rise to
a lien, have looked to Italian law as the lex loci contractus, and then, in view of the
Italian practice of applying the law of the flag to conflict of laws cases involving
foreign flag vessels, they have employed the principle of renvoi. Thus, in The Coast-
wise, 291 Fed. 166 (D. Mass. 1923), involving supply of bunkers in Italy to an American
flag vessel, the U. S. Maritime Lien Act of 1910 was applied. See also Brandon v. S.S.
Denton, 302 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1962); The R, C. Rickmers, 1924 Am. Mar. Cas. 971
(S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Italian supplier of German vessel not entitled to a maritime lien
because under German law if a supplier has reason to know he is dealing with
charterer and not owner, no lien attaches).
French courts apply the law of the flag with respect to privileges that may have
arisen against French flag vessels in other countries on the theory that since arts.
190-96, Code of Commerce make no territorial distinctions, they must be presumed
to apply to French vessels everywhere. 2 RIPERT 109.
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In the present illustration, how should a French court treat the
claim of an American supplyman in a proceeding also involving
claims of British, French, Spanish, and Italian creditors of the same
class? Suppose, for example, that under the particular facts there
were a real conflict between the federal maritime law of the United
States and the 1926 Liens Convention on the question of whether a
supply claim gave rise to a lien or privilege; such a conflict would
exist if more than six months had elapsed since the supplies were
furnished in the United States. Under these circumstances, the
supplyman might still have a valid lien if he had arrested the vessel
in a United States port, since the more flexible doctrine of laches
rather than a fixed period of limitations governs in the United
States admiralty courts; the claim would probably not be entitled to
lien or privilege status under the 1926 Convention.' 9
Such a case presents a difficult conflict of laws problem. Certain-
ly if a United States supplyman extended credit to a vessel in New
York, his normal expectation would be that a lien would arise under
the Federal Maritime Lien Act.80 This expectation deserves protec-
tion, no matter in-what country the vessel happens to be arrested
and sold, and for this reason the lex loci contractus should be ap-
plied. In practice, however, the lex loci contractus has not been uni-
formly applied because of the difficulties arising where claimants of
many different countries seek to prove preferred claims against a
vessel."' For what are termed public policy reasons, a French court
considering the facts of the above illustration would find it very
difficult to determine that the claim of the United States supplyman
was valid, under one standard, and then, under another standard,
to reject the more recent claims of French, Italian, and Spanish
supplymen relating to the very same vessel.8 2 The conflicts rule of
70 See Liens Conv., art. 9(1), note 59 supra.
80 § 30 P, 41 Stat. 1005 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 971 (1958), expressly provides that any
person furnishing necessaries "to any vessel, whether foreign or domestic . . ." shall
have a maritime lien. (Emphasis added.)
81 See notes 77, 78 supra; notes 82-85 infra.
82 See, e.g., The Wang Importer, Cour d'Appel, Rennes, Feb. 6, 1962, [1962] D.M.F.
475, which involved claims of French, Egyptian, and American supplymen against
a U.S. flag vessel sold by a French court. The court appears to have applied the
lex fori on the ground that no further exceptions to the fundamental principle of
equality among creditors should be made except those required under the lex Jori. Cf.,
4 RABEL 120-21: "A Dutch judge cannot be forced to recognize privileges of enforce-
ment not existent in our country to the detriment of our own subjects."
Thus, when there are multiple claimants with similar type claims (e.g., oil com-
panies which have bunkered the same vessel in the forum state and in various
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lex fori is more easily administered than lex loci contractus, and the
courts in France,83 Great Britain,8 4 and elsewhere,8 5 have favored
the former. Even in the United States where many cases state the
rule that the lien status of supply claims is governed by the lex loci
contractus, the statements are often only dictum; the courts usually
apply the lex fori because of failure to plead or prove the foreign
law.86
Thus, in the above illustration, a French court would most prob-
ably determine the validity and ranking of all supply liens according
to the lex fori, the 1926 Convention or its domestic law equivalent.
Under the priority rules of the 1926 Convention, the law costs,
wage claims, and the supply and repair liens of less than six months
would prime the Italian mortgage.
E. Fifth Illustration
Let us assume that a Panamanian vessel mortgaged to a Nor-
wegian creditor is libeled in the United States by the mortgagee.
Intervening libels are filed by members of the crew asserting a lien
for wages and by supplymen from Egypt, France, and Spain. Al-
though the United States is not a signatory to the 1926 Convention,
other countries), it becomes difficult, as a practical matter, to permit some claimants
a privileged position, thereby exhausting the sale proceeds, and leaving other claimants
with similar type claims without anything.
"8The general rule applied by French courts with respect to foreign vessels is
that only claims privileged under the lex fori will be recognized and they will rank
in the order enumerated under French law. See, e.g., The Wang Importer, supra note
82; Fouquet et Cie. v. Capitaine et Armateurs du Vanchelis, Trib. Civ., Tarascon,
March 27, 1931, 9 REVUE DE DROIT MARITIME CoiPARi: SUPPLEMENT BIMENSUEL DE
DROrT MARITIME FRAN.AIS [hereinafter cited as DOR. SupP.] 214 (1931); Std. Correia
Leit Santos & Cie. v. Chaume, Cour d'Appel, Bordeaux, June 23, 1930, 9 DOR. SuPP. 184
(1931); Claverie v. Ordre Malveira, Trib. Civ., Montpellier, April 20, 1923, 1 DOE SuPP.
281 (1923); Atat Major du Kolyma v. Ferrat, Cour d'Appel, Alger, Jan. 24, 1923, 1 DoR
Supp. 423 (1923); 2 RIPERT 113.
84 English cases consider both the existence of a lien and the priority accorded
it to be procedural rather than substantive matters. See The Tagus, [1903] P. 44
(C.A.); The Milford, Swab. 362, 166 Eng. Rep. 1167 (A.C. 1858); PRicE 207-10.
85E.g., Belgium: Rotterdamsche Scheepshypoteeksbank v. Hertha, Arbitral Trib.,
Antwerp, Nov. 26, 1929, 22 REv. DOR 175 (1930) (lex fori applied to questions of
existence of privileges and rank on German flag vessel); Holland: The Fleiss, Rotter-
dam, March 22, 1935, Weekblad van het Recht, No. 12,985, 33 REv. DoR. 400 (1936)
(where creditors were of multiple nationality, Dutch law applied to question of validity
of privileges). See also Schad~e, Resumd de Jurisprudence Nierlandaise 1957, 1958,
1959, [1960] D.M.F. 309.
8 See, e.g., The Hoxie, 291 Fed. 599 (D. Md. 1923), aft'd, 297 Fed. 189 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 266 U.S. 608 (1924) (U.S. vessel supplied in Denmark by Danish subsid-
iary of American corporation; U.S. law applied); The Snetind, 276 Fed. 139 (D. Me.
1921). See also cases cited at note 76 supra.
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the foreign ship mortgage would now be recognized as within the
admiralty jurisdiction and therefore a valid lien by virtue of the
Foreign Ship Mortgage Act of 1954,87 provided that it was a valid
mortgage under the law of Panama.
Assuming that no United States supply or repairmen were in-
volved, what law should govern the question of whether valid wage
or supply liens were created? The present factual situation presents
a particularly apt occasion for application of the rule that the lien
status of a supply or repair claim should be governed by the law
of the place of the transaction."" The lex loci contractus in the case
of claimants from France, Norway, Spain, and Egypt is the 1926
Liens Convention, to which all these countries are signatories.
Suppose, for example, that the Egyptian supply lien were eight-
een months old, the French lien twelve months old, and the Spanish
lien five months old. Under American law, the twelve month and
five month claims might well be valid, while the eighteen month
claim would probably be barred by laches unless the claimant could
produce satisfactory reasons excusing its delay in prosecuting the
claim. However, under the 1926 Convention in effect in Egypt,
Spain, and France, the Egyptian and French claimants would be
deemed to have lost their liens by virtue of the six month limita-
tion.89 The limitation period, which is a fundamental characteristic
of a privilege or lien under the 1926 Convention, should be con-
sidered as substantive and not a matter of procedure governed by
the law of the forum.90
17 68 Stat. 323 (1954), 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1958). In The Aruba: (Rederiaktierbolaget
v. Compania de Navegacion Anne, S.A.), 139 F. Supp. 327 (D.CZ. 1955), a case
involving a Panamanian vessel, a Swiss company holding a ship mortgage executed
according to the laws of Panama was permitted to intervene pursuant to the Preferred
Foreign Ship Mortgage Act of 1954. The court rejected the contentions of the
original libelant, suing for charter hire, that the 1954 act was intended to protect only
American nationals having mortgages upon foreign flag vessels.
88 See note 76 supra.
19 Liens Cony., art. 9(1), note 59 supra.
90 Under the general rules of conflict of laws in the United States, procedure will
be determined by the law of the forum, and statutes of limitation are generally con-
sidered procedural. RESTATE.,iENT, CONFUCT OF LAws § 585 (1934). Hence the courts
will permit a foreign lienor to recover even though his claim would be barred under
the statute of limitations in the place where it arose. For a discussion of conflicting
statutes of limitation and maritime liens, see GILso & BLACK 633-37.
In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955), the plaintiff, a
Panamanian seaman employed on a Panamanian vessel, brought an action for wages
based upon the Panama Labor Code, which provided a one year period of limitations.
The action was brought in New York more than two years after accruing, and the
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Suppose further that the Panamanian vessel were chartered to
an English company and that the charter agreement contained a
clause providing that the charterer was without authority to bind
the vessel. Under United States law such a clause could prevent the
creation of maritime liens for supplies,91 but under the liens con-
vention in effect in Norway, Spain, Egypt, and France, such a pro-
vision would not be given legal effect so as to deprive a supplier of
his lien.92
Regarding the claims of the seamen, the American court should
apply the law of the flag, Panamanian law, in determining whether
certain fringe benefits payable under the contract of service are
entitled to a lien;93 the rule applicable in cases involving American
vessels under which vacation and pension claims do not give rise to
a maritime lien should not be carried over to situations involving
foreign vessels.
Having determined what claims give rise to a lien, how should
the American court determine the order of priority in which the
liens should be satisfied? If claims of United States nationals and
those of nationals of other countries having a different rule arise in
the same case, the only practical solution is often to apply the rule
of the forum to resolve the priority question.94 However, if all the
defense of laches was raised. The district court held that although the New York
statute of limitations in contract actions was six years, New York's borrowing statute
required that when a cause of action accrues outside of New York in favor of a
nonresident, the action will be barred by the shorter of the New York or the foreign
statute. 117 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). This decision was reversed by the Second
Circuit. Cf. Baez-Geigel v. American Foreign S.S. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), where in an action by a Puerto Rican longshoreman for injury suffered in
Puerto Rico, the court considered the Puerto Rican statute of limitations of one year,
the New York borrowing statute and the Puerto Rican tolling statute as tolling the
period of limitations during a period when defendant was not amenable to suit in
Puerto Rico.
" 46 U.S.C. § 973 (1958). The circumstances under which a supplyman will be put
on inquiry have been the subject of much litigation. See, e.g., First Natl Bank &
Trust Co. v. The Seneca, 179 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 366 (5th
Cir. 1961); The Hoxie, 291 Fed. 599 (D. Md. 1923), aff'd, 297 Fed. 189 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 266 U.S. 608 (1924); GILmOmRE & BLACK 219, 558-68.
'"Liens Cony., art 13: "The foregoing provisions of this Convention also apply
to vessels in the possession of a time charterer or other person operating, but not
being the owner of the vessel, except in cases where the owner has been dispossessed
by an illegal act, or where the claimant is not a bona fide claimant."
For a comparative treatment of the respective liability of shipowner and bareboat
charterer under the laws of various maritime nations, see Muller, Proprietaire-
Armateur et Armateur Exploitant, [1962] D.M.F. 131.
011See note 74 supra.
" The Oconee, 280 Fed. 927 (E.D. Va. 1922); The Scotia, 35 Fed. 907, 910-11
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liens arose by virtue of the law of the same foreign country or, as
in the present example, if the laws of several foreign countries
involved are identical, the law of the forum would not be a good
choice. If all parties similarly situated belong to countries subscrib-
ing to the 1926 Convention, a United States court should properly
apply the priority rules of the convention rather than federal legisla-
tion having no substantial connection to the litigation. 5 According-
ly, on the facts as stated, if the rules of the 1926 Convention were
applied, the order of priority between the liens and the mortgage
should be (1) law costs; (2) seamen's wages; (3) the five month old
supply. lien; and (4) the mortgage. The twelve and eighteen month
old supply claims would be deemed to have lost their right to prefer-
ence and would share only in what remained of the sale proceeds
after satisfaction of the liens.
If supply or repairmen who had furnished their services to the
vessel in the United States were involved in the present example,
they would be entitled to a preference over the Norwegian mortgage
by virtue of the last clause of the Foreign Ship Mortgage Act of
1954. It should be noted, however, that the effect of this statutory
preference for American materialmen, under these facts, is to give
them the same priority over a foreign ship mortgage that a supply-
man or repairman who enforces his claim within six months is
entitled to have under the 1926 Brussels Convention.
(S.D.N.Y. 1888). In the first case, an American flag vessel was involved, and the court
rejected the libelant's contention that because supplies had been furnished to the
vessel in Germany, the supply lien arising under German law should prevail over a
prior United States preferred ship mortgage. Although such priority would have been
accorded under German law, it was held that priority was governed by the law of
the forum. Since the available fund was exhausted by the mortgage, the court did
not reach the question of whether the supplyman's lien arose under German or
United States law. In any event, a lien on these facts would arise under the laws
of both countries. See 4 RABEL 119-22 and German, Canadian, Scottish, Danish, and
Dutch cases there cited.
Rabel quite rightly argues that it is an untenable assertion that priority is pro-
cedural; rather the law of the forum is applied by virtue of the emergency nature
of ship foreclosure proceedings. It follows, he continues, that whenever the laws of
the places most closely connected with the underlying transactions "produce identical
results of rank, they should prevail over the lex fori. In fact, such an exception has
been made by the Dutch district court of Rotterdam. . . . When the laws governing
the competing claims, such as a mortgage contracted in Norway and an English
lien for supply, agree on their rank, the lex fori is disregarded. Thus, the emergency
function of the domestic law of the court is perceived and adequately limited."
Id. at 121-22.
"nId. at 121-22.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the international nature of shipping and the wide-
spread international participation in ship financing, there is a real
need for uniformity on questions relating to the enforceability of
security interests in ships. The two Brussels conventions have helped
to reduce the number of conflicts between the laws of the maritime
nations, and they have served as models for legislation in some of
the newly independent ones. It is idle, however, to pretend that the
success of these conventions is anything like what it might have been
with the adherence of the United States.96
There has been some discussion about revising the 1926 Liens
Convention.97 If this were done, the United States should take an
active role in reducing conflicts arising between the various national
laws dealing with liens and mortgages. United States opposition to
the 1926 Convention was in part based upon constitutional grounds,
but this objection was overcome in The Thomas Barlum, 98 where
the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress to
legislate on matters of admiralty jurisdiction. The question of en-
forcement of foreign ship mortgages might perhaps be made the
subject of a separate convention, for there is greater international
accord on this than on the troublesome questions of liens and their
priority.99 However, the question of mortgages is so intimately tied
to the question of the priority of mortgages and liens that it would
be better not to diminish the coverage of the 1926 Convention. By
and large, the same liens are recognized under both Anglo-American
law and the convention. The order of priority is not too different,
with the exception of the relative positions of mortgages and ma-
terialmen's liens. Under the 1926 Convention, the supplyman pre-
vails over the mortgagee, but only if he acts within the very short
00 Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 878, 893 (1955).
07 See, e.g., Schadde, Quelques Notes Marginales d la convention sur les privileges et
hypothques rnaritimes, [1959] D.M.F. 252, where it is suggested: (1) that the Liens
Cony. be harmonized with 1957 Cony. on Limitation of Liability; (2) that article
2(5), providing a lien for supply and repairmen, is no longer necessary because these
people extend credit to the owner or his agents, not to the master, and they could
arrange for other forms of security, such as a bond; (3) that article 8, 'which provides
a droit de suite, fails to mention freight or accessories; and (4) that classification of
liens by voyage is meaningless today.
08 293 U.S. 21 (1934). See also GIrmRE & BLrACK 571-74.
0' See Comment, supra note 96, at 905.
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period of six months. Under American law, the mortgagee prevails
over subsequent supply claims, but supplymen are not so arbitrarily
precluded nor is the home port limitation present. In essence, each
system seeks to balance the rights of mortgagees and supplymen, and
there is no reason why some international agreement cannot be
reached on what should be the balancing factors.
With respect to the 1952 Arrest Convention, the right to arrest
a vessel in the United States is much broader than in any of the
countries which have adopted the convention. The only advantage
to the United States in adhering to this convention would be the
guarantee to United States litigants in the courts of convention
states that they would enjoy the benefits of the convention, including
the right not to have domestic law restrictions upon the right to
arrest a vessel about to sail applied against them.100
2
1
1 See notes 5, 21 supra.
